The Theory Of Collusion And Competition Policy Av Joseph E. Jr. (Professor Of Economics The Wharton School At The University Of Pennsylvania ) Harring

<b>A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement.</b><p>Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement.</p><p>The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and